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Metaphysical or Practical Humanism
The Specificity of Antispeciesism
by
Gaetano Chiurazzi (University of Torino)
1. The Misadventures of Humanism
The concept of humanism has been criticized in the past century from two 
points of view, the one metaphysical, and the other ethical. Firstly, human-
ism appeared, albeit paradoxically, as a concept steeped in metaphysical 
presuppositions, that is, in an essentialist conception of the human; secondly, 
and precisely on the basis of this metaphysical claim, humanism was consid-
ered as a form of domination, both of the human over other humans and of 
the humans over other living species. The reference to an essence of human 
being (for instance: rationality) appeared as a principle of exclusion or of 
subordination of those entities that do not correspond to the definition of 
the human: “marginalized” beings such as the primitives, the madmen, the 
nonhuman animals.
Michel Foucault has well expressed such a diffidence against humanism. 
To the attempt at finding an essence of the human being he opposed the 
expectation of emancipation, in terms of a historical ontology of ourselves; 
to the progress of truth he opposed the history of freedom; to the analytic 
of truth (understood in a Kantian way as a search for the necessary limits 
of knowledge) he opposed an ontology of actuality (understood, on the 
contrary, as a search for the contingent limits of our actual condition and 
for their possible overcoming).1 Critique, according to Foucault, is more a 
practical and contingent act than a universal theory or a doctrine. It must 
warn against the risks of all universalistic theoretical assumptions. Such 
anti-metaphysical posture entrusts emancipation to minimal practical ges-
1 Michel Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?, in: Dits et écrits II, 1976–1988, 
Paris 2001.
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tures of freedom rather than to revolutionary action or an utopian ideal. In 
conformity with what Foucault pregnantly calls “micro-physics of power”, 
we could call these minimal erosions and disarticulations of power a “micro-
physics of freedom”: a set of minimal, daily actions, the efficacy of which, 
exactly as in the case of power, is greater the more hidden and widespread it 
is. The resources of emancipation, in the epoch of the pervasive diffusion of 
power and of the ongoing leveling out of human life, lie in this “differential 
practice of freedom”, as we could also call it. More than a complete dismissal 
of humanism, we can consider Foucault’s critical position as a “practical 
turn” in regards to the very concept of humanism: what characterizes the 
being human is not an alleged eternal essence but an expectation of eman-
cipation and a practice of liberation.
2. An Egalitarian Ethics
A challenge against the very idea of humanism is presented nowadays by a 
movement that, in the name of liberation, has in the last decades even more 
radically problematized the concept of the “human” and the position of the 
human being in the world of living beings: this is the so-called movement 
of “animal liberation.” Promoted by Peter Singer with his Animal Liberation 
(1975; third edition 2002), this movement aims in fact at re-considering the 
belonging of the human being to the animal world and its relations with dif-
ferent animal species in view of a deletion, or a reduction, of the boundaries 
among them. This movement is guided by two presuppositions: the first is 
the claim that no human must be exploited by other humans, an idea which 
is extended to the entire animal world; the second is Bentham’s claim that 
what must inspire human action towards other animals is not the question 
whether or not they are rational but whether they suffer. The former leads 
to inter-species egalitarianism: all animals are equal, as the title of the first 
chapter of Singer’s book states. The arguments that allow apportioning 
fundamental rights to some human minorities, such as South-American 
Indians, women, blacks, and children, are this way extended to non-human 
animals. One could certainly argue that there are
obvious ways in which men and women resemble each other closely, while humans and 
animals differ greatly. So, it may be said, men and women are similar beings and should 
have similar rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have 
similar rights.2
2 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, New York 2002, p. 2.
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Nevertheless, according to Singer, even though we can rightly find several 
differences between humans and animals, this limitation cannot be “a bar-
rier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to non human 
animals”.3
Beyond every superficial and individual difference, then, the equality of all 
living beings represents a presupposition and a feasible project of animalist 
ethics, whose goal is to affirm the right of all animals to equal respect. In this 
sense, it is the antidote to every form of speciesism. The word “speciesism” 
is formed in analogy to other similar words, such as “racism”: it denotes 
“a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of interests of members of one’s 
own species and against those members of other species”.4 Antispeciesism, 
therefore, as the position advocating the extension of rights from humans to 
animals, requires the overcoming of the specific differences that distinguish 
the human and the animal in favour of their nearest genus, which they can 
be referred to, and which is of course that of animality itself. Consequently, 
humans are not entitled to exploit nonhumans.
Speciesism is generally legitimated on the basis of cognitive differences 
among living beings, such as intelligence, language, and the ability to reason. 
Antispeciesism, therefore, can find the principle of egalitarianism only in 
something common to different animal species. This is the capacity for suf-
fering, as Jeremy Bentham had the merit of stressing: “The question is not, 
Can they [the animals] reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?” Put-
ting the question this way, Bentham “points to the capacity for suffering as 
the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration”.5 
This capacity – or, more precisely, the capacity for suffering and/or en-
joyment or happiness – is assumed as a “prerequisite for having interest at 
all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in 
a meaningful way”.6 The feature that collapses all the boundaries among 
animal species is the capacity for suffering, which states the minimal inter-
est in not suffering: if this feature, on the one hand, unites all the animal 
species, on the other hand it distinguishes the animal from the stone, which 
is not able to suffer. The basis of such claim is physiology: in fact, only the 
being provided with a nervous system can suffer. And although suffering is 
something completely private, analogical reasoning allows us to say that, in 
circumstances similar to those in which we suffer, other humans, and other 
living beings, would also suffer.
3 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 2.
4 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 6.
5 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7.
6 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7.
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Antispeciesist universalism thus has a biological-evolutionary ground 
which does not provide a clear boundary for the distinction between suf-
fering and non-suffering beings. What is in fact – we might wonder – the 
evolutionary level that allows distinguishing the capacity and the incapacity 
for suffering? Does a jellyfish or a mosquito suffer? And if not, should they 
be allowed to be killed? But what is more puzzling in Singer’s arguments is 
the fact that respect for other animal species’ suffering ultimately depends 
on the capacity to extend one’s own feeling to other animal species, and 
then on an analogical inference: that is, on a rational capacity. This intro-
duces a gap between the biological ground, which should be common to all 
living beings, and the capacity for understanding this universality: the animal-
ist ethics is universal in its biological ground but inevitably human in its 
ethical ground. Thus, antispecisim, as an ethical perspective, cannot be but 
a perspective typical of a particular species, that which is able to produce 
inferences, to universalize, and also to understand the suffering of others.7
The “antispeciesist fallacy” consists in this claim of breaking the barriers 
of animal species, by being forced to admit, however, that this capacity is 
peculiar only to the human species. One could not otherwise understand 
the shift from a descriptive to a prescriptive view, evident in the claim that 
“the principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged 
actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human 
beings”.8 This shift clearly introduces an element – the capacity to obey a 
prescription, an “ought” – as determinant factor of animalist ethics, which 
has no natural ground but is eminently ethical, and thus not natural. Or, if it 
is natural, it is so by virtue of the biological specificity of the human, who, 
because of its physical make-up – to have a brain able to achieve determi-
nate inferences and analogical reasoning – is also able to have respect for 
other suffering beings. The imperative of reducing violence, exploitation, 
and suffering is then precisely an imperative, which as such draws a distinct 
line within the animal world between beings for which this imperative has 
a meaning and which are able to respect it as such, and beings which are 
unable to do this.
7 Cf. Antonio Carioti, Ma nessun animale è animalista, in: Il Corriere della sera 
(http://lettura.corriere.it/debates/ma-nessun-animale-e-animalista/).
8 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 5.
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3. L’Animot
Against the “biologistic continuism”9 of Singer’s view, Jacques Derrida con-
siders the question concerning the human-animal relationship from another 
point of view. The reference to Derrida is important here for two reasons: 
first, because it represents a clear polemic against the biologistic grounds of 
antispeciesism; secondly, because, despite, or perhaps just by virtue of some 
internal fractures, it allows reconsidering the reasons for humanism, not in 
a metaphysical but in a practical sense, and therefore in a way which meets 
Foucault’s anti-metaphysical position.
Also in Derrida’s case, the relation between human and animal takes a rel-
evant meaning since it touches the question of the definition of the human. 
But to Derrida’s eyes the way this question is treated in the antispeciesist 
theory cannot be but a re-proposal of the principal polemical target of de-
construction: the question of identity. Actually, antispeciesism, with its claim 
about a substantial homogeneity between human and animal, does nothing 
but extend the field of identity on which it tries to found its egalitarian eth-
ics. On the contrary, according to Derrida, what every consideration of the 
animal has until now failed to account for is the deployment of differences 
which characterize the field denoted by the word “animal”. This field ends 
up being nothing more than a word. In order to highlight this nominalistic 
issue, Derrida introduces the neologism “animot”, which sounds like the 
French plural “animaux”, written substituting the final suffix of the plural 
with the term “mot”, “word”: what we designate by the general word “ani-
maux” is only a name for a field where an irreducible plurality is in force, a 
field of differences of which it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a com-
mon substrate. Yet what can unite the great variety of the living, from the 
amoeba to the human?10
If, on the one hand, the word “animot” appears as a reaction against the 
oblivion of difference – to quote the Heideggerian formula, which is not 
without relation with what I will say later on –, on the other hand, the way 
Derrida addresses the question of the human-animal relation seems, in its 
 9 Jacques Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, translated by David Wills, New 
York 2008, p. 30.
10 We can charge traditional humanism with logocentrism only if we understand logo-
centrism in a narrow meaning as indicating the primacy of reason. But if logocentrism in 
general means the primacy of identity over difference, any project that aims at reducing 
differences is logocentric. Therefore, it is antispeciesist naturalism that is logocentric, since 
instead of affirming the differences, it tends to efface them, as well as all those conceptions 
that, according to Derrida, from Descartes to Kant, from Heidegger to Levinas and Lacan, 
have never taken “into account the essential or structural differences among animal spe-
cies” (Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 89).
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turn, to efface the difference. This impression arises from a certain “phe-
nomenological primitivism”, which presents this relation as a relation of 
gazes, as a question of seeing, of seeing each other, of seeing oneself naked 
and of the gaze that sees nakedness, without the consciousness of nakedness. 
The nakedness is the common, pre-conscious and undifferentiated condi-
tion of the human and of the animal.
The theme of nakedness in fact plays a very fundamental role in Der-
rida’s book The Animal that therefore I am. It seems to function as a reference 
to a condition where human and animal are on the same level, where the 
human literally sheds all that distinguishes him from the animal and makes 
him similar to the animal: his rationality, his consciousness, his ethics, his 
mental and real habits. In a word: his world. I will discuss then this theme 
of nakedness considering it as a point of convergence – or, as we could also 
say, of divergence – between humans and animals. This discussion especially 
involves three moments:
1) The appearance of consciousness, as a passage from animality to hu-
manity;
2) The concept of the world, as a passage from the naked to the dressed 
condition;
3) The problem of the θεορεῖν in its relation to experience, that is of the 
“as such”, as a passage from what I call the “phenomenological primitivism” 
to the “hermeneutical pre-positivism”.
4. Hominization as Increasing of Differences
Derrida describes the experience of nakedness as a play of gazes in which 
the gaze of the animal cannot be reduced to that of the human. Or, in other 
words, the animal’s gaze is the gaze of the absolutely other, that precedes 
me, and which I follow.
The animal is there before me, there next to me, there in front of me – I who am (fol-
lowing) after it. And also, therefore, since it is before me, it is behind me. It surrounds me. 
And from the vantage point of this being-there-before-me it can allow itself to be looked 
at, no doubt, but also – something that perhaps philosophy forgets, perhaps being this cal-
culated forgetting itself – it can look at me. The point of view of the absolute other […].11
This relation of gazes, unlike the speculative reflection of the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic – to which it appears too easily assimilable –, as the 
early moment of humanity that arises from the unconscious bottom of life, 
remains a dissymmetrical play: the animal regards me and sees me naked 
11 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 11.
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but never the same way I see it naked and see myself naked. The animal’s 
gaze represents that primitive phenomenological gaze that I can only grasp 
by ‘undressing myself,’ even my own consciousness of being naked, since 
consciousness represents the passage from animality to humanity:
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called “animal” offers 
to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, 
that is to say, the border crossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to 
himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself.12
The possibility of calling himself is the possibility of consciousness, of say-
ing “I”.
This passage is represented by the attainment of the upright position: “My 
hypothesis is that the criterion in force, the distinctive trait, is inseparable 
from the experience of holding oneself upright, of uprightness [droiture] 
as erection in general in the process of hominization”.13 It is a movement 
of elevation that symbolically describes the entrance into culture, which, 
as Gadamer says by quoting Herder, is just an “elevation to humanity”; 
more precisely, elevation is the proper feature of humanization, so that the 
locutions “elevation to humanity” and “humanity as elevation” become 
equivalent.
The evolutionary process of elevation ushers in the parting from natural-
ness, when the human animal becomes self-conscious and able to say “I”. 
Kant, according to Derrida, has expressed this relation in his Anthropology 
from the Pragmatic Point of View. This power of saying “I”
erects, it raises (erhebt) man infinitely (unendlich) above all the other beings living on earth 
(unendlich über alle andere auf Erden lebende Wesen). This infinite elevation identifies a subject 
in the strict sense, for immediately after Kant emphasizes the fact that “I” signifies the 
unity of a consciousness that remains the same throughout all its modifications.14
The physical elevation of the human is a symbol of his transcendental el-
evation above the mere field of sensibility. Interpreting this elevation as a 
domination, Adorno ends up saying that every idealism is in its ground a 
fascism: “for an idealist system, he says, animals virtually play the same role 
as Jews did for a fascist system. Animals would be the Jews of idealists, who 
would be thus nothing as virtual fascists”.15
In any case, even supposing that transcendentalism is intrinsically domina-
tion, we can wonder what the counterproposal would be in order to avoid 
such an elleged domination. Some recent forms of realism – especially the 
12 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 12.
13 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 61.
14 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 92.
15 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 109.
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so-called “new realism” – that argue explicitly against transcendentalism 
on behalf of a return to sensible experience, pretend to propose the same 
return to a naturalistic egalitarianism against which we could voice the same 
objections Plato directed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus. Protagoras’ thesis 
“knowledge is sensation (aisthesis)” is quite analogous to the thesis affirming 
that humans are nothing but animals. But this, as Plato ironically objects to 
Protagoras, does not explain how it is that Protagoras requests payments on 
the reason that he is more sapient than the pig or the tadpole. The over-
coming of this naturalistic sensism already leads in Plato to the elaboration of 
a new anthropology which is sketched in the excursus about the “styles of 
life”. Scholars from the analytic tradition have considered this excursus as a 
deviation from the main epistemological problem of the dialogue,16 or even 
as a digression completely “irrelevant to the topic of the dialogue”,17 a mere 
“footnote or appendix.”18 I claim, on the contrary, that the digression about 
the two alternative bioi, which occupies the central part of the dialogue, is 
fundamental to the subsequent development of the argumentation. The 
reason is not, as Burnyeat writes, that “we may be jolted into reflecting for 
a moment that the question ‘what is knowledge?’ is important because there 
are certain things it is important to know”19, but rather because the digres-
sion outlines a completely different anthropology from the Protagorean one. 
If the human being is defined only by sensation, he can then be compared 
to the pig, the baboon, or even the tadpole, so that Plato can conclude that, 
“while we were admiring him [Protagoras] for a wisdom (εἰς φρόνησιν) 
more than mortal, he was in fact no wiser than a tadpole, to say nothing of 
any other human being”.20 Plato thereby aims at showing that the human 
cannot be reduced to the unique dimension of sensation, since he is able 
to transcend the immediacy of the hic et nunc, thanks to a different power, 
dianoia. Thought, which characterizes the philosopher’s life, “takes wing, as 
Pindar says, ‘beyond the sky, beneath the earth’, searching the heavens and 
measuring the plains”21. This ‘idealistic claim’, far from being a way to level 
the real, or even worse, to dominate the human, is a way to free him, since 
it increases the differences, and so doing, opens new dimensions, new pos-
sibilities: the human being does not dominate but forms a world.
16 Burnyeat speeks of an “abortive discussion” or a “strange intrusion” (Myles Bur-
nyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, with a translation of Plato’s Theaetetus of M. J. Levett, 
Indianapolis 1990, p. 34).
17 Gilbert Ryle, Plato’s Progress, Cambridge 1966, p. 278.
18 John McDowell, Plato: Theaetetus, translated with notes, Oxford 1973, p. 174.
19 Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, p. 36.
20 Plato, Theaetetus, 161 c–d.
21 Plato, Theaetetus, 173 e–174 a.
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5. World-Forming
This is the thesis Heidegger presents in The Fundamental Concepts of Meta-
physics. By commenting on this thesis, Derrida claims, rightly, that the 
problem of the difference between the human and the animal boils down, 
eventually, to the problem of saying what the world is. But this question 
boils down, in turn, to the question of the ‘as such’. Both questions have to 
do with the problem of nakedness, and of the animal seeing my nakedness. 
It is indeed this difference in the way of seeing that determines the difference 
between human and animal. It is neither a biological nor a metaphysical 
difference: both naturally naked, they are different by the fact that man, 
in contrast to the animal, covers his nakedness with clothes, habits, that is, 
with behaviours, feelings, and ways of being. They are ethical, since ethics 
concerns ways of life, ways of being-in-the-world, all that which, as Der-
rida writes
is meant by living, speaking, dying, being, and world as being-in-the-world or being-
within-the-world, or being-with, being-before, being-behind, being-after, being and 
following, being followed or being following, there where I am, in one way or another, 
but unimpeachably, near what they call the animal.22
All these relations, which I call “pre-positive” because of their grammatical 
and ontological nature, concern the behaviour of the human, namely what 
he has to take off when he tries to be similar to the animal, that is, when 
he tries to be naked. The condition of the animal, its point of view, requires 
this “giving up”, as an epoché, the human world. I think that in other con-
texts (for instance, in the Speech and Phenomena), Derrida would have put 
into question the theme itself of nakedness, in the name, precisely, of what 
now seems to be put in brackets, the world. The gaze of the animal and the 
whole scene in which the human is seen naked is a sort of phenomenologi-
cal reduction that implies the epoché of the world. This is precisely what for 
Heidegger was impossible to achieve, inasmuch as Dasein is, constitutively, 
in the world.
As is well known, Heidegger calls this inescapable relation between 
Dasein and world habitare (to dwell). The use of this verb, a frequentative 
of habere, refers to the practical horizon, which provides a backdrop for 
the existential analytics. Franco Volpi has shown that the conceptuality of 
this analytics is a translation of main concepts of the Aristotelian practical 
philosophy: the Zuhandenheit corresponds to ποίησις, the Vorhandenheit to 
22 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 11.
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θεορία, the care to ὄρεξις, the existence to πρᾶξις.23 All this contributes 
to outline the parallelism, which Gadamer also stressed,24 between under-
standing and φρόνησις, i. e. the emotional intelligence that governs πρᾶξις 
or human action. But this practical dimension is still evident in the word 
Heidegger uses to designate the relation of Dasein to the world, “having”:
Man also stands over against the world. This standing-over-against is a “having” of world 
as that in which man moves, with which he engages, which he both masters and serves, 
and to which he is exposed. Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part 
he is at once both master and servant of the world [zugleich Herr und Knecht der Welt].25
We cannot overlook the reference to the Hegelian dialectic of master and 
slave. This dialectic, however, is here articulated not as a confrontation 
between self-consciousnesses but as a confrontation between the human 
being and its world, in the face of which the human is at the same time 
master and slave. The result of this relation is culture (Bildung), the world 
that the human forms (bildet) just by existing towards it both as master and 
as servant.26 “To have” a world means that the relation with it is an ethical 
relation, made of ἕξεις, to use the Aristotelian word derived, like its Latin 
translation habitus, from ἕχειν, and which we translate as “behaviours”. The 
human relates to the world according to specific behaviours as modes of the 
“being-in”: being-with, being-for, being-before, being-behind, being-after, 
all the relations I defined above as “pre-positive”, thereby hinting at their 
relational, connective, syntactical feature. These relations are not objects of 
vision: we cannot see them, they are not positive like the table, the book, 
or the sun, but are relations, syncategorems, which we can only understand 
and which precede every positivity, every being this or that “as such”. To 
have a world, then, does not mean to see this and that, but to understand 
the possible relations between this and that. The human is world-forming 
because it works out these relations inside its vital environment, certainly 
more than the animal.
23 Cf. Franco Volpi, L’esistenza come praxis. Le radici aristoteliche della terminologia 
di Essere e tempo, in: Gianni Vattimo (ed.), Filosofia ’91, Roma-Bari 1992, pp. 215–252.
24 In his translation of the Book VI of the Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Frankfurt 
am Main 1998), Gadamer translates φρόνησις with “praktische Vernünftigkeit”, “practical 
good sense”. This way he distances himself consciously from the normal German transla-
tion, Klugheit, closer to the Latin word prudentia introduced by Cicero rather than to the 
Greek, and puts it close to the concept of Verstehen, understanding, as described in the 
§ 31 of Being and Time.
25 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World Finitude 
Solitude, translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington and Indian-
apolis 1995, p. 177.
26 This point should be taken into account, above all against the charges of “anti-
realism” levelled to Heidegger and to philosophical hermeneutics.
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6. Animal Phenomenology
In the previous considerations, I tried to sketch out the difference, in regards 
to the question of the animal, between the phenomenological primitivism 
of Derrida and the hermeneutical pre-positivism of Heidegger. This distinc-
tion also deals with the problem of θεορία and the concept of experience. 
Derrida describes the gaze of the animal that sees me naked as that primi-
tive phenomenological experience that philosophy has never addressed, or 
rather has always denied. Speaking about the way Descartes, Kant, Hei-
degger, Levinas, and Lacan have always spoken about the animal, Derrida 
writes that all seem like
they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that 
addressed them. At least everything goes on as though this troubling experience had not 
been theoretically registered, supposing that it had been experienced at all, at the precise 
moment when they made of the animal a theorem, something seen and not seeing. The 
experience of the seeing animal, of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into 
account in the philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse. In sum they 
have denied it as much as misunderstood it.27
Philosophy, as Derrida claims, has never had the experience of the animal 
seeing me naked. I think that, beyond the question whether or not this is 
true, Derrida’s claim implicitly poses some questions about the condition of 
the theory itself, as well as its relation to experience, which revolve around 
the question of the “as such” as it is presented in Heidegger’s The Funda-
mental Concepts of Metaphysics. For Heidegger, the animal is “poor in world” 
(weltarm) because it is not able to accede to the being “as such”: whereas the 
stone has no relation to other beings, the lizard has a relation to the stone 
which appears to it, as well as to the sun, but not as such, as a stone or as a 
sun as such.28
Derrida understands the “as such”, which Heidegger speaks of in these 
pages, as a manifestation of being independent from every interested relation 
of Dasein: the being considered “as such” is the being left to be what it is. 
This sounds somewhat paradoxical, especially in comparison with the on-
tological presuppositions of the existential analytics in Being and Time and 
with the notion of the world that was worked out there: the world is in 
fact a web of relations, of senses which structure the care of Dasein and his 
behaviours towards intra-worldly being. In this context, the “as such” of the 
being cannot be but its sense for Dasein. On the contrary, in the 1929–30 
course, the “as such” would appear as the negation of those kinds of rela-
tions which, with its needs and interests, distinguish the animal. Without 
27 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I am, p. 14.
28 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, § 47.
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relation to Dasein, the “as such” would furthermore be, as Derrida writes, 
the modality of objectivity, opened by the possibility of my not being, that 
is, of my death: to let the being be
is the relation to the being as such, that is to say, the relation to what is inasmuch as one 
lets it be what it is, that is to say, that one doesn’t approach it or apprehend it from our 
own perspective, from our own design. In order to have a relation to the sun as it is, it is 
necessary that, in a certain way, I relate to the sun such as it is in my absence, and it is in 
effect like that that objectivity is constituted, starting from death.29
Understood this way, the “as such” is rather an “in itself ”: the being con-
sidered without relation to Dasein. It seems therefore closer to the way the 
stone, which has no relation to other things and is therefore without world, 
relates to being: the ontology of objectivity, understood as Derrida describes 
it, is the ontology of the stone. This means that, in order for the “as such” to 
appear, there has to be no Dasein, and thus no world! It is therefore ques-
tionable whether the “as such” should be understood in this way.
In order to clarify this question, we must pay attention to the fact that, 
for Heidegger, the possibility of the “as such”, what we can define as the 
positive manifestation of something as what it is (the sun as sun, the stone 
as stone, and so on), lies in the possibility of the manifestation of a being as 
being. He writes thus:
Only where beings are manifest as beings as such, do we find the possibility of experienc-
ing this or that particular being as determined in this or that particular way – experienc-
ing in the broader sense which goes beyond mere acquaintance with something, in the 
sense of having experiences with something. Finally, only where there is the manifestness 
of beings as beings, do we find that the relation to these beings necessarily possesses the 
character of attending to … whatever is encountered in the sense of letting it be or not let-ting it be. Only where there is such letting be do we find at the same time the possibility 
of not letting be.30
Here it is clear that the manifestation of a being as such implies the mani-
festation of being as being, which does not exclude, but implies in its turn 
the relation to Dasein. This conclusion is nothing but the consequence of 
the most fundamental theorem of Being and Time, that is, that the sense of 
29 The more the “as such” assumes phenomenological accents, the more Heidegger 
distances himself from Nietzsche. Nietzsche, actually, would have answered “no” to the 
question of whether it is possible, for the human, to accede to the “as such” (understood as 
“let the being be as it is”, in the absence of every kind of design). For him, Derrida notes, 
“everything is in a perspective; the relation to a being, even the ‘truest’, the most ‘objec-
tive’, that which respects most the essence of it is such as it is, is caught in a movement that 
we’ll call here that of the living, of life, and from this point of view, whatever the difference 
between animals, it remains an ‘animal’ relation” (Derrida, The Animal that therefore 
I Am, 160). Do we then not admit this “animal relation” also in the case of the human?
30 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 274 [modified].
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being lies in understanding. We can call then this primary manifestation of 
being (quite analogous to the ἀλήθεια) hermeneutical “as such”, since it 
involves the understanding of Being, and then the ontological difference. 
The hermeneutical “as such” is relational and differential. The diversity is 
then the main feature of the “as such”: beings are not
merely uniformly presented to us on the world-stage as a confused manifold of juxtaposed 
items. On the contrary, within beings there are certain fundamentally diverse “kinds” of be-ings, which prescribe certain contexts in respect of which we take up a fundamentally dif-ferent position, even if we do not become conscious of this diversity as a matter of course.31
But beings can also fall into undifferentiatedness: “On the contrary, at 
first and for the most part in the everydayness of our Dasein we let be-
ings come toward us and present themselves before us in a remarkable 
undifferentiatedness.”32
Can we relate this undifferentiatedness to the gaze of the animal, inasmuch 
as it, like the gaze of the everydayness, does not accede to the differentiation 
of the “as such”? The answer to this question is not simple, since, on the one 
hand, it is true that the gaze of the animal is not able to differentiate its and 
my nakedness (and therefore does not understand the nakedness as such), 
but, on the other hand, the undifferentiatedness of the everydayness is, for 
Heidegger, a possibility of Dasein, and not of the animal. However that may 
be, it seems to me clear that the whole of Derrida’s strategy aims at finding 
the point of contact between human and animal, consisting in that primi-
tive phenomenological view, in which the human and the animal appear in 
their undifferentiatedness, both naked, an experience which precedes every 
theory, or, in other words, a form of theory – of gaze – before every dif-
ferentiatedness. On the contrary, Heidegger sees in differentiation the very 
beginning of the experience and of the theory, as “letting be the thing what 
it is,” a standpoint which is not biological nor metaphysical, but practical, 
in the sense that it shows what humans and animals do, or cannot do, their 
way to move or to live, or, in other words, their way to exist in the world.
6. Ethics and Heterobiography
I suggest then that the biologistic continuism of Peter Singer and the phe-
nomenological primitivism of Jacques Derrida have in common the search 
for a certain point of undifferentiatedness between the human and the ani-
mal: this is found in the common nervous system, on the one hand, and in 
31 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 275.
32 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 275.
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the basic naked view, on the other hand. In the hermeneutical perspective, 
the relation between human and animal is on the contrary a differential 
relation which lies in πρᾶξις, in their concrete capacities that make the dif-
ference between them. Without this difference, or any difference at all, no 
ethics would be possible. Antispeciesism sees every reference to the differ-
ence between the human and the animal as an act of mastery, of domination, 
and founds the ethical relation in the common capacity for suffering: the 
question that guides this ethics is “can animals suffer?” But precisely this 
approach reveals the problem at stake here, which we can resume in the 
possibility of heterobiography.
Derrida rightly remarks that auto-affection cannot be denied to animals:33 
even they are capable of awareness, but the very question, then, is whether 
they are capable of understanding the other, namely, to relate not only to 
themselves, but also to the others, and ask therefore “Can they suffer?” The 
question, then, is not whether animals suffer or are able to be conscious, but 
whether they understand alterity. If ethics still has a meaning, this involves 
the capacity for creating a distance from one’s own autobiographical close-
ness, from what Heidegger calls Benommenheit, thereby enabling an opening 
to the other.
The human being – the “animal which dresses” –, is able to understand 
the alterity of the animal, as the being that does not dress, and is not ashamed 
of its nakedness. The animal can see me naked but, unlike the human, it does 
not grasp the difference between itself and me, as the difference between 
being naked and being dressed. The primitive phenomenological homolo-
gation of nakedness, just like the biologistic continuism, is not sufficient for 
founding the ethical relation, which supposes and does not delete the differ-
ence with the other, and then the understanding. This is the same as saying 
that, if there is an ethical reason for antispeciesism, it cannot but lie in the 
human specificity to understand the other, the specificity of the other, his 
difference. Far from leading us to antecedent evolutionary grades, to that 
aspect that we share with other living beings (to a biological primitivism), 
or to pre-cultural forms of living (to a phenomenological primitivism), 
antispeciesism – when taken as meaning the ethical choice of not privileg-
ing one’s own species – leads us to the most advanced moments of human 
evolution, those in which the human becomes a cultural, educated (gebildet) 
being. Antispeciesism is the perspective peculiar to that particular “species” 
which is human: the species that, more than others, is not a species, since it 
33 Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, p. 94.
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is not something “naturally” defined, the species that makes of the “second 
nature” (his dress) his very nature, or which is naturally cultural.34
The overcoming of metaphysical humanism cannot be but hermeneuti-
cal, which also means practical, since hermeneutics is rooted in the practical 
live of the human being: only hermeneutics, contrary to what some of its 
critics claim,35 is structurally able to understand difference, to understand 
the other. Its λόγος is what Plato defined, at the end of the Theaetetus, as 
σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία, “understanding your difference,”36 which is the 
best way to explain what “as such” means. The possibility to say “I”, that 
is, consciousness, implies the possibility to distinguish I from Thou, of “un-
derstanding your difference”, which is also the very beginning of the ethical 
relation. The notion of “ontological difference”, it has to be reasserted, is at 
the very end the main constitutive concept of philosophical hermeneutics, 
the concept itself of understanding as always implying a difference.
Summary
A criticism of the metaphysics of humanism does not necessarily involve the dismissal 
of humanism itself, as it can be rehabilitated from a practical standpoint. In this article 
two positions are discussed: that of Peter Singer in Animal Liberation and the position of 
Jacques Derrida. Despite their difference, they are united by the search for an egalitarian 
ground: a biologistic continuism in the former case, and a phenomenological primitivism in the 
latter. Both put in brackets the difference between the human being and the animal due to 
their different practical capabilities, the fact, namely, that the human being, as Heidegger 
puts it, is “world-forming”. This is a discriminating capacity, it entails the understanding 
of the other and its suffering. An antispecisist ethics is thus possible only on the basis of this specificity of the human being.
34 Cf. John McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge 1996. The difference between 
this position and other specisist’s claims that refer to an essence of the human being lies 
in the fact that, in my position, the alleged essence consists in not having an essence, or, 
in other words, in having an extremely malleable, flexible, open one.
35 Cf. for instance Bernhard Waldenfels, Vielstimmigkeit der Rede. Studien zur 
Phänomenologie des Fremden, vol. IV, Frankfurt 1999, p. 67. Against this claim cf. Do-
natella Di Cesare, Verità e metodo – cinquant’anni dopo. La filosofia contemporanea 
fra il comprendere e l’altro, in: Tropos, n. 2 (2000), pp. 55–73.
36 Plato, Theaetetus, 209 a.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Kritik der humanistischen Metaphysik führt nicht notwendigerweise zur Preis-
gabe des Humanismus, da dieser von einem praktischen Standpunkt her rehabilitiert 
werden kann. In diesem Text werden zwei Positionen in Betracht gezogen: diejenige 
Peter Singers in Animal Liberation und diejenige Jacques Derridas. Trotz einer Reihe an 
Unterschieden sind beide Ansätze durch die Suche nach einem egalitären Grund ver-
bunden, die im ersten Fall zu einem „biologistischen Kontinuismus“, und im zweiten zu 
einem „phänomenologischen Primitivismus“ führt. Beide klammern den Unterschied 
zwischen Menschen und Tieren ein, einen Unterschied, der von praktischen Fähig-
keiten abhängig ist, beziehungsweise dem Umstand, dass der Mensch, wie Heidegger 
es ausdrückt, „weltbildend“ ist. Dazu gehört die Fähigkeit der Differenzierung, die 
das Verstehen des Anderen und auch das Verstehen seines Leidens ermöglicht. Eine antispeziezistische Ethik ist daher nur aufgrund dieses Spezifikums des Menschen möglich.
